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NARROWING THE SCOPE OF THE SPEEDY
TRIAL RIGHT:

UNITED STATES V.

M CDONALD
N February 1970 the wife and two small children of Captain Jeffrey
MacDonald, an Army physician, were murdered at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina.' The Army initially charged MacDonald with the killings,
but in October 1970 dropped the charges. 2 At the request of the Justice
Department, however, the Army continued its investigation of the crime
and compiled a series of reports on the incident during the years 19711973. 3 Based on these investigations, the Justice Department decided to
prosecute and in January 1975 succeeded in obtaining a grand jury indictment charging MacDonald with murder. 4 Following a jury trial in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina,
MacDonald was convicted on three counts of murder and sentenced to
three consecutive life imprisonment terms. MacDonald then moved to vacate the convictions and dismiss the indictment. 5 He argued that the government's failure to bring him to trial until four and one half years after
his initial military arrest constituted a violation of his sixth amendment
right to a speedy trial.6 The district court denied the motion, but the
h The murders took place in the family's home on the base. When the military police

arrived at the scene after receiving a call from MacDonald, they found that the three victims
had been stabbed to death and that MacDonald himself had passed out from a knife wound

to the chest. MacDonald claimed that the family was attacked by several intruders who
knocked him unconscious and murdered his wife and children in a ritualistic manner. Physical evidence at the scene, however, contradicted portions of MacDonald's story, and led
Army investigators to suspect that MacDonald himself had committed the crime.
2. In May 1970 the Army formally charged MacDonald with the murders pursuant to
art. 30 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 830 (1976). An Army
officer was appointed to investigate the charges as required by art. 32 of the UCMJ. Id
§ 832. After conducting a thorough investigation, the officer filed a report recommending
that the charges against MacDonald be dropped. On review of the report, the commanding
officer at Fort Bragg dismissed the charges. Brief for the United States at 4-5. Several
months after the dismissal of charges, MacDonald was granted an honorable discharge that
barred any further military proceedings against him.
3. Beginning in January 1971 the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID)
launched an intensive investigation of the murders, and in June 1972 the CID submitted a
thirteen-volume report to the Justice Department recommendin 8 further investigation. At
the request of the Justice Department, the CID submitted additional reports in November
1972 and August 1973. Brief for the United States at 5-6.
4. MacDonald was charged with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1976). The district
court had jurisdiction because the crime was committed on military property. Id § 7(3).
5. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972), the Supreme Court held that dismissal
of charges is the only possible remedy when a speedy trial has been denied.
6. The sixth amendment provides that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Prior to his trial,
MacDonald moved to dismiss the indictment on the same speedy trial grounds he had as-
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Fourth Circuit reversed on appeal. 7 Finding that MacDonald's right to a
speedy trial attached at the time of his military arrest and remained in
effect until the civilian trial, 8 the court held that the delay between arrest
and trial was unreasonable and violated the sixth amendment. 9 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed and remanded: The time between dismissal of criminal charges and subsequent
indictment on the same charges may not be considered in determining
whether a defendant's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial has been
violated. United States v. MacDonald, 102 S. Ct. 1497, 71 L. Ed. 2d 696
(1982).
I.

ATTACHMENT AND TERMINATION OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT
DURING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

The sixth amendment to the Constitution, which guarantees the right to
a speedy trial to every criminal defendant,' 0 has long been recognized by
the courts." When considering whether the right has been violated, a
court must initially determine whether a delay in bringing the defendant to
trial has been excessive. 12 In order to measure the length of a pretrial
serted after his conviction, and the district court denied the motion. The Fourth Circuit
reversed, United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1976) (MacDonaldI), but the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded on procedural grounds without reaching the merits
of the sixth amendment issue. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
MacDonald then took another interlocutory appeal, arguing that the institution of civilian
proceedings after dismissal of the military charges constituted a violation of his fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. United States v. MacDonald, 585 F.2d 1211 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 961 (1979). The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument and
held that because the military proceedings were investigative only and did not establish
MacDonald's guilt or innocence, the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy
did not bar subsequent civilian prosecution. 585 F.2d at 1212. For commentary on the
application of the double jeopardy clause to the Fourth Circuit's 1978 MacDonald opinion,
see Schuman, Did Captain MacDonald Receive a Speedy Trial?, 54 CONN. B.J. 69, 74-76
(1980).
7. United States v. MacDonald, 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1980) (MacDonaldII). For
commentary on MacDonald11, see Note, Right to Speedy Trialin Civilian ProsecutionDenied
by Delay Following Dismissal of Military Charges-United States v. MacDonald, 17 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 89 (1981).
8. 632 F.2d at 261. In MacDonald I the Fourth Circuit stated its reasons for counting
the period between dismissal and reindictment fo r speedy trial purposes. The court held
that the dismissal of military charges did not dispel the effects of initial prosecution, because
MacDonald remained under suspicion and was subjected to the anxiety of another prosecution. Id at 204.
9. The court found that the delay was sufficiently excessive to trigger the analysis developed by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), for determining
speedy trial violations. 632 F.2d at 262. Applying the Barker analysis, the court found that
MacDonald's right to a speedy trial had been violated because: (I) the government had
asserted no adequate explanation for the delay; (2) MacDonald had timely asserted his right;
and (3) a substantial possibility existed that MacDonald's defense was prejudiced by the
delay. Id at 262-67. For a discussion of the Barker test, see infra note 12.
&0.U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For the text of the sixth amendment, see supra note 6. For
discussion of the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial, see generally C. WHITEBREAD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 474-81 (1980).

11. For an historical discussion of the speedy trial right, see Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213, 223-26 (1967).
12. A finding of excessive delay in bringing a defendant to trial does not in itself estab-
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delay, the court must decide at which stage in the prosecution the defendant becomes entitled to a speedy trial.' 3 Furthermore, if charges against a
defendant have been dismissed and later reinstated, the court must consider the effect of 4the suspension in the proceedings on the defendant's
speedy trial right.'
Most lower federal courts have held that the speedy trial right attaches
only after prosecution has been formally initiated and not during prearrest
investigation.' 5 In United States v. Marion' 6 the Supreme Court followed
these lower court holdings. In Marion the defendants were indicted on
several counts of fraud approximately three years after the completion of
the alleged criminal scheme. The government, however, had knowledge of
the scheme at the time of its completion. The defendants claimed that the
preindictment delay was inherently prejudicial to their ability to prepare
an adequate defense and therefore violated their sixth amendment right to
a speedy trial. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that
the protection of the sixth amendment only becomes available when criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who are accused during that prosecution. 17 Noting that the purpose of the speedy trial
right is to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration and minimize the anxiety and concern generated by public accusation, the Court stated that the
government's act of arrest and detainment triggers the sixth amendment.' 8
According to the Court, until arrest or indictment an individual does not
suffer any restraints on his lifestyle and is not the subject of public accusation; 19 only formal indictment, information, or the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge activate the
lish a violation of the right to a speedy trial. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966). In
Ewell the Supreme Court held that a defendant's speedy trial right is violated only if he can
show that a lengthy delay: (1) prejudiced his ability to defend himself; or (2) resulted in
oppressive
incarceration. Id. at 120-22. For commentary on Ewell, see 54 GEo. L.J. 1428
(96).
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Court developed a four-part balancing test
for determining violations of a speedy trial right. The Court cited the length of the delay as
the initial "triggering" factor of the test: if a delay is determined to be excessive, a court
must consider: (1) the reason for the delay; (2) whether the defendant timely asserted his
right; and (3) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay. Id at 530. For commentary on Barker, see Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial GetsA Fast Shuffle, 72 COLUM.
L. REV. 1376 (1972); Note, supra note 7, at 95-102; 26 VAND. L. REV. 171 (1973).
13. For example, see Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182, 185 n.3 (4th Cir. 1968), and
Foley v. United States, 290 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1961), in which both courts held that the
delay must be computed from the time of institution of formal criminal proceedings against
the defendant.
14. See infra notes 33 & 47 and accompanying text.
15. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 315 n.8 (1971), and cases cited therein.
16. 404 U.S. 307 (1971). For commentary on Marion, see 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 420 (C. Torcia 12th ed. 1975); Comment, The Speedy Trial Guarantee- Criteria and Confusion In InterpretingIts Violation, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 839, 857-64 (1973).
17. 404 U.S. at 313.
18. Id. The Court stated that "[alrrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with
the defendant's liberty, . . . and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his
famil and his friends." Id
1. Id at 321.
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protection of the sixth amendment. 20
Although it refused to extend sixth amendment protection to prearrest
and preindictment delay, the Court in Marion recognized that such delay
may create a possibility of prejudice to the defendant at trial. 2 1 The Court
observed, however, that prejudice may result from any delay, and a
lengthy period prior to arrest and indictment may weaken the government's case as well. 22 The Court also noted that two safeguards protect

against prejudice resulting from delay between the commission of a crime
and the arrest or indictment. First, statutes of limitation require the government to begin prosecution within a specific time and thus provide protection against the bringing of stale criminal charges. 23 Secondly, under
certain circumstances the due process clause of the fifth amendment 24 may
require dismissal of charges if the defendant can show that he was actually
25
prejudiced by a prearrest or preindictment delay.
The Supreme Court again considered the time of attachment of the
speedy trial right in Dillingham v. United States.26 In Dillingham the defendant was not indicted until twenty-two months after his arrest and was
not tried until twelve months after indictment. The Fifth Circuit rejected
the defendant's claim that his right to a speedy trial had been violated and
held that preindictment delay need not be counted when evaluating a
speedy trial claim. 27 In reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its position in Marion that the speedy trial right attaches at the
time of arrest.28 The Court, therefore, held that in addition to the postindictment period, the period between arrest and indictment must be con29
sidered for purposes of speedy trial analysis.
Although Marion and Dillingham firmly established that the right to a
20. Id. at 320.
21. Id. at 321. The Court acknowledged that a lengthy delay may impair a defendant's
ability to prepare a defense because memories may fade, evidence may be lost, and witnesses
may disappear. Id. at 322. For a discussion of the effect of a pretrial delay on the defendant, see generally L. KATZ, JUSTICE IS THE CRIME: PRETRIAL DELAY IN FELONY CASES 5659 (1972).
22. 404 U.S. at 322.

23. Id.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." For background on the relationship between speedy
trial analysis and the fifth amendment, see Lite, The Pre-Accusaiion Delay Dilemma, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 539 (1980).
25. 404 U.S. at 324. The Court refused to decide under what circumstances a showing
of actual prejudice would require dismissal pursuant to the due process clause. Id In
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977), however, the Court held that proof of actual
prejudice to the defendant makes a due process claim ripe for adjudication, but in order to
obtain dismissal the defendant must show that the government violated "fundamental conceptions of justice." Id. at 789-91. For a discussion of Lopasco and the due process clause
as applied to prearrest delay, see Note, supra note 7, at 104-08.
26. 423 U.S. 64 (1975).
27. United States v. Palmer, 502 F.2d 1233, 1235 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing United States v.
Smith, 487 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 846 (1974)), rev'dsub am. Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975).
28. 423 U.S. at 65.
29. Id
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speedy trial attaches at the time of arrest and formal charging, the
Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of attachment of the right
when prosecutors dismiss charges against a defendant and subsequently
indict him on the same charges. 30 The question therefore remains open
whether the speedy trial right attaches at the time of original charging and
remains effective throughout the period between dismissal and indictment,
right is terminated at dismissal and attaches anew upon
or whether the
3
reindictment. 1
Federal courts that have considered the effect of dismissal and reindictment on the right to a speedy trial have split on the issue. 32 A number of
circuits have held that the right terminates at dismissal and reattaches
upon reindictment, so that the period during which charges are suspended
33
may not be considered when determining the length of delay before trial.
Thus, in United States v. Martin34 the Sixth Circuit held that a two-year
period between the dismissal of charges and reinstitution of the same
charges was irrelevant for speedy trial purposes. 35 The court relied on the
30. The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment prohibits multiple prosecutions
for the same offense. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury
is empanelled and sworn, and in a nonjury trial when the court begins to hear evidence.
Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975). The double jeopardy clause, therefore, is
not violated when charges against a defendant are dismissed and he is later reindicted, as
long as trial does not begin before dismissal of charges. See United States v. MacDonald,
585 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 961 (1979).
31. In Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), however, the Supreme Court
held that discharging an accused from custody does not necessarily terminate his right to a
speedy trial. The Klopfer case involved a North Carolina procedural device that allowed a
prosecutor to take a nolleprosequi on an indictment, thereby discharging the accused from
custody and tolling the statute of limitations. Id. at 214. Under the nolleprosequi procedure, the prosecutor could reinstate the indictment at any subsequent term of court. The
Court ruled that this procedure denied the defendant his right to a speedy trial because it
indefinitely prolonged the indictment without any stated justification. Id at 222. In so
holding, the Court emphasized that the pendency of the indictment would likely cause the
defendant anxiety even after he had been discharged from custody. Id Because the indictment in Klopfer was never actually dismissed, the Court did not decide whether the time
between successive prosecutions must be considered for speedy trial purposes. For commentary on Klopfer, see Note, CriminalLaw-The Right to a Speedy Trial is a FundamentalRight
Guaranteedby the Sixth Amendment, 10 S. TEx. L.J. 168 (1968); 18 MERCER L. REV. 497
(1967).
32. Compare United States v. Hillegas, 578 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Martin, 543 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1050 (1977); United States v.
Bishton, 463 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (all holding speedy trial clause inapplicable to time
period between dismissal of charges and reindictment) with Jones v. Morris, 590 F.2d 684
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 965 (1979); United States v. Merrick, 464 F.2d 1087 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972) (both holding that delay between dismissal and
reindictment must be included for speedy trial purposes).
33. Many state courts hold this view. See, e.g., State v. Avriett, 25 Ariz. App. 63, 540
P.2d 1282 (1975) (speedy trial time period begins anew when original indictment dismissed);
State v. Goodmiller, 86 Idaho 233, 386 P.2d 365 (1963) (one-year period between dismissal
and reindictment ignored in determining whether defendant's speedy trial right violated);
State v. Fink, 217 Kan. 671, 538 P.2d 1390 (1975) (time elapsed during entire period of first
indictment irrelevant for speedy trial purposes); State v. Rhodes, 77 N.M. 536, 425 P.2d 47
(1967) (three-year delay between dismissal and reindictment on same charge not included in
computing speedy trialtime).
34. 543 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1050 (1977).
35. Id at 579.
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Marion rule that the right to a speedy trial does not attach until arrest or
formal charging 36 and reasoned that because the defendant was not
charged with a crime during the period between dismissal
and reindict37
ment, he was not denied the right to a speedy trial.
In United States v. Bishton38 the District of Columbia Circuit likewise
held that a delay between dismissal and reindictment may not be considered in determining speedy trial violations. 39 The D.C. Circuit cited the
Marion rule and emphasized that after dismissal and before reindictment
40
the defendant was a free man against whom no prosecution was pending.
4
The Ninth Circuit adopted the same rule inArnold v. McCarthy ' and held
that after the original charges had been dismissed the defendant was no
longer accused, so that under Marion he had no right to a speedy trial until
42
reindictment.
In United States v. Hillegas4 3 the Second Circuit held the speedy trial
clause inapplicable to a three-year period between dismissal and reindictment because after dismissal of charges the defendant was free from any
arrest restraints." According to the court, the defendant was not subject to
disruption of employment, public ridicule, or more stress than any other
person who might be under police investigation and not charged with a
crime. 45 Furthermore, the Second Circuit found that neither the defendant
nor the public in general had any interest in promptly processing a "non'46
existent case."
Several circuits, however, have held that the suspension period must be
considered when evaluating a claim that the speedy trial clause has been
violated, because the speedy trial right does not terminate at dismissal and
reattach at reindictment. 47 In addition to the Fourth Circuit's decisions in
MacDonaldI and 11,48 the Seventh and Tenth Circuits have adopted this
36. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.

37. 543 F.2d at 579.
38. 463 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
39. Id. at 889-90.
40. Id. at 891. The court found that when a person has not been arrested or indicted, he

"'suffers no restraints on his liberty and is not the subject of public accusation; his situation
does not compare with that of a defendant who has been arrested and held to answer.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 (1971)).
41. 566 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1978).
42. Id at 1383. The Ninth Circuit has since limited its holding in Arnold to cases in
which the original indictment was dismissed as a result of a mistrial. The court left open the
question whether the postdismissal period will be considered for speedy trial purposes when

dismissal does not follow a mistrial. United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1233 n.13 (9th
Cir. 1980).
43. 578 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1978).
44. Id at 458.
45. Id
46. Id.

47. A number of state courts have also adopted this position. See, e.g., Florida ex rel.
Barber v. Satin, 296 So. 2d 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (357-day delay between dismissal
and reindictment considered in determining that defendant's speedy trial right had been
violated); Johnson v. State, 252 Ind. 79, 246 N.E.2d 181 (1969) (one-year period between
nolleprosequi dismissal and reindictment included for speedy trial purposes).
48. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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view. In Jones v. Morris49 the Seventh Circuit assumed, without discussing
its reasoning, that a six-month delay between dismissal and reindictment
must be counted for purposes of the speedy trial analysis.5 0 The Tenth
Circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v. Merrick,' 1 another
case involving a six-month period during which charges were suspended.
The Tenth Circuit simply included the six-month period in computing trial
delay without offering any explanation of its reason for doing so52
The Fifth and D.C. Circuits have considered the problem of determining the time to be counted for speedy trial purposes when the government
intentionally dismisses an indictment and reinstitutes charges in order to
gain a tactical advantage over the defendant.5 3 These courts have reasoned that when the government implements such delaying strategy, the
in detertime after dismissal and before reindictment must be considered
54
mining whether the sixth amendment has been violated.
Although the D.C. Circuit had held in United States v. Bishton that the
postdismissal period was irrelevant for speedy trial purposes, 5 the same
court held otherwise when the government dismissed an indictment in one
forum in order to reindict the defendant in a more favorable jurisdiction.
In United States v. Lara5 6 prosecutors dismissed indictments against the
defendants in the District of Columbia and, because Florida was a more
favorable jurisdiction for the government's case, reindicted the defendants
in the Fifth Circuit. In finding the time of delay to be the period from the
original indictment in the District of Columbia until the Florida trial, the
court emphasized that it could not tolerate long and unnecessary delay
57
caused by the government's attempt to seek a procedural advantage.
The Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Davis58 that the speedy trial
analysis must be applied from the date of the second indictment against a
defendant. 59 In that case, however, tactical delay by the prosecution was
not shown. In contrast, United States v. 4valos 60 presented the Fifth CirAvalos prosecucuit with the problem of government "court shopping." In4
tors dismissed narcotics charges against the defendants in order to reindict
them in a more favorable Florida court. The Fifth Circuit condemned this
tactical delay by the government and measured the pretrial delay from the
49. 590 F.2d 684 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 965 (1979).
50. 590 F.2d at 686.
51. 464 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972).
52. 464 F.2d at 1090.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 970 (1977); United States v. Lara, 520 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v.
McKim, 509 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1975).
54. For commentary supporting this argument, see Misapplication of the Constitutional
Rights to a Speedy Trial, Fourth Circuit Review, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 563, 587 (1981).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
56. 520 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
57. Id at 464.
58. 487 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 981 (1974).
59. 487 F.2d at 116.
60. 541 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1979).
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time of the original indictment. 6' The court held that failure to measure
the speedy trial period from the defendant's initial arrest would permit the
and
government to circumvent the speedy trial requirement by dismissing
62
reinstituting a complaint and indictment for the same offense.
II.

UNITED STATES V MACDONALD

In UnitedStates v. MacDonaldthe Supreme Court confronted the question of the time period to be considered in the speedy trial analysis when
criminal charges against a defendant are dropped and later reinstituted.
The Court ruled that the time between the dismissal of charges and reindictment on the same charges may not be considered when evaluating 63a
claim that the sixth amendment speedy trial clause has been violated.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger 64 first reaffirmed the Court's
holdings in both Marion and Dillingham that the right to a speedy trial
does not attach until a defendant is indicted, arrested, or officially accused. 65 As in Marion, the majority emphasized that the primary purpose
of the speedy trial clause is to "minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to
shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges."'66 The Court thus made clear that the speedy
trial guarantee was not intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused
by the passage of time, because that interest is protected by the fifth
67
amendment due process clause and statutes of limitation.
The Court then held that because the speedy trial clause was designed to
protect only against lengthy pretrial incarceration and anxiety caused by
accusation, the right to a speedy trial is no longer applicable once the government, in good faith, drops charges against a defendant. 6 8 The majority
61. 541 F.2d at 1108 n.13.

62. Id.
63.

102 S. Ct. 1497, 1501, 71 L. Ed. 2d 696, 703 (1982).

64. Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined Chief Justice Burger in the
majority opinion.
65. 102 S. Ct. at 1501, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 702-03. For a discussion of the Court's treatment
of speedy trial measurement in Marion and Dllingham, see supra text accompanying notes
15-29.

66. 102 S.Ct. at 1502, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 704.
67. Id The defendant argued that even if his right to a speedy trial did not attach until

the time of civilian indictment, the lengthy preindictment delay resulted in actual prejudice
at trial and violated fundamental conceptions of justice. The defendant claimed, therefore,
that under United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977), his due process right had been
violated. Brief for Respondent at 31. The Supreme Court, however, refused to rule on the
due process issue and remanded the issue to the court of appeals for resolution. 102 S.Ct. at
1500 n.5, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 702 n.5. For a discussion of Lovasco, see supra note 25.
68. 102 S.Ct. at 1501, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 703. The Court noted that its holding is in
agreement with the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976 & Supp. V
1981). 102 S. Ct. at 1501 n.7, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 703 n.7. Section 3161(h)(6) provides that if the
government initially dismisses charges against a defendant and later reindicts him on the
same charges, the time between dismissal and redindictment must be ignored for speedy trial
purposes. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6) (1976). For commentary on the Speedy Trial Act of 1974,
see Black, The Speedy TrialAct-Justiceon the Assembly Line, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 225 (1976);
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noted that once charges are dismissed, personal liberty is impaired to a
lesser degree than while a defendant is accused of a crime.69 The majority
stated further that when charges are no longer pending against a defendant, he is at worst placed in the same position as a person who is subject to
a criminal investigation and not yet accused. 70 The Court thus emphasized that once charges have been dismissed, any restraint on liberty, strain
on financial resources, disruption of employment, and exposure to public
experienced by any
ridicule, stress, and anxiety are no greater than that
71
person who is subject to a criminal investigation.
Turning to the specific situation in MacDonald, the Court noted that
once the Army dropped the military charges against the defendant, there
was no criminal prosecution upon which he could have been tried until the
1975 civilian indictment. 72 The Court further noted that during the intervening period, MacDonald was not under arrest, in custody, or subject to
any criminal prosecution, but was free to continue his life. 73 The Court

held that during the time between the dismissal of military charges and the
indictment on civilian charges, MacDonald was legally and constitutionally in the same position as if no charges had been brought, and therefore,
this period could not be counted for speedy trial purposes. 74 According to
the Court, the only time that could be counted, the period between civilian
indictment and75 trial, was not sufficiently lengthy to constitute a speedy
trial violation.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dissented
vigorously, arguing that "nothing in the language [of the sixth amendment]
suggests that a defendant must be continuously under indictment in order
to obtain the benefits of the speedy trial right. '' 76 Justice Marshall claimed
that even after termination of an initial prosecution, the anxiety suffered
77
by the accused is sufficiently harsh to require speedy trial protection.
Such anxiety is more serious than that of a person merely under investigation, argued Justice Marshall, because the government has already demonstrated the seriousness of its prosecutorial threat by initially bringing
Frase, The Speedy TrialAct of 1974, 43 U. CH. L. REV. 667 (1976); Platt, The Speedy Trial
Act of 1974: A Critical Commentary, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 757 (1978).

69. 102 S.Ct. at 1502, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 704.
70. Id
71. The Court noted that although the knowledge of an ongoing criminal investigation
would certainly cause stress and discomfort, and possibly disrupt one's lifestyle, these results
would be true whether or not charges had been filed and then dismissed. Id
72. Id at 1503, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 705.
73. Id
74. Id
75. Id The Court emphasized that MacDonald had conceded that the delay between
his second indictment and trial resulted primarily from his own delay tactics. Id.
76. Id at 1505, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 708.
77. Id at 1506, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 709. Justice Marshall argued that Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), indicated that the anxiety suffered by a defendant, even after
termination of the proceedings and his release from custody, requires application of the
speedy trial protection. 102 S.Ct. at 1506, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 709. For a discussion of Klopfer,
see supra note 31.
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charges. 78 The dissent also claimed that the majority's holding, by allowing the government to dismiss charges against a defendant and reindict
him on the same charge, will encourage unjustifiable delays in bringing
79
defendants to trial.
Having decided that the time period between dismissal and reindictment
must be included for sixth amendment purposes, Justice Marshall then
considered whether MacDonald's speedy trial right had been violated by
the delay between military arrest and civilian trial.80 In so doing, Justice
Marshall relied on the four-factor test developed by the Court in Barker v.
Wingo.81 Although he called the question a close one, Justice Marshall
found that MacDonald's right had been violated under the Barker analysis, because (1) the length of the delay was excessive; (2) the government
was unable to justify the delay; (3) MacDonald had repeatedly asserted his
right to a speedy trial; and (4) the delay likely resulted in prejudice to
82
MacDonald at trial.
Justice Stevens concurred with the majority opinion, although he agreed
with the dissent's argument that the speedy trial right is not suspended
between dismissal and reindictment.8 3 Justice Stevens joined the majority
because he believed the government's interest in proceeding cautiously and
deliberately before making a final decision to prosecute for serious offenses
'8 4
to be of "decisive importance.
The MacDonaldopinion represents the Supreme Court's first attempt to
resolve the conflict among the circuits regarding the measurement of
speedy trial time after dismissal of charges and before reindictment on the
same charges. The Court, however, limited its holding to cases in which
the government dismisses the original charges in good faith.8 5 By stressing
that "this is not a case where the government dismissed and later reinstituted charges to evade a speedy trial guarantee, '8 6 the Court indicated that
it might be willing to consider the time between dismissal and reindictment
for speedy trial purposes when the government has reinstated charges
against a defendant simply to gain a tactical advantage. As the dissent
observed, however, such a result would be inconsistent with the MacDonald ruling that the speedy trial right is irrelevant to time periods when the
87
defendant is not accused.
78. 102 S. Ct. at 1507, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 710.
79. Id at 1508, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 712.
80. Id
81. Id at 1509, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 712 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)). For a
discussion of Barker, see supra note 12.
82. 102 S. Ct. at 1509-10, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 712-14.
83. Id at 1503, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 705-06.
84. Id
85. The Court stated that "the Speedy Trial Clause has no application after the Government, acting in good faith, formally drops charges." Id at 1501, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 703.
86. Id at 1503 n.12, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 705 n.12.
87. Justice Marshall's dissent stated:
The majority's statement that the delay in this case was not in bad faith. . . is
puzzling. Under the majority's constricted view of the Sixth Amendment, the
good or bad faith of the government in the period between successive prosecu-
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The Court's opinion in MacDonald is, therefore, somewhat confusing.
The primary significance of MacDonald is that it precludes courts from
counting the time between dismissal and reindictment for sixth amendment purposes absent a showing of government bad faith in reinstituting
charges. The question remains unanswered, however, whether the Court
will allow the time between successive prosecutions to be considered in
evaluating a speedy trial claim when the government dismisses and reinstates charges merely for strategic purposes.
III.

CONCLUSION

In United States v. MacDonald the Supreme Court held that the time
between the dismissal of criminal charges and subsequent reindictment on
the same charges may not be considered in determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. The Court first reaffirmed its
position in United States v. Marion that the speedy trial right attaches only
upon formal charging or indictment and is designed primarily to protect
against lengthy pretrial incarceration and anxiety resulting from public accusation. The Court then narrowed its Marion holding by reasoning that
once prosecutors dismiss charges against a defendant, he suffers no greater
anxiety or restraint on personal liberty than an individual who is merely
under investigation and not yet accused. The Court, therefore, concluded
that once an indictment is dismissed, the individual is placed in the same
position as a person whose speedy trial right has not yet attached. In MacDonald, by emphasizing that the government did not dismiss and reinstitute charges in order to gain a strategic advantage, the Court left open the
possibility that the time between successive prosecutions may be considered for speedy trial purposes if the government engages in bad faith
tactics.
Paul A Clevenger

tions is entirely irrelevant to whether the defendant's speedy trial right has
been violated, since the defendant is not continually under formal accusation
during that period.
Id at 1508 n.6, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 712 n.6.

